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Abstract We study the empirical consistency of survey based (micro level) indicators of
social capital and local government performance on the one, and municipality based
(aggregate level) measures of these two concepts on the other hand. Knowledge about the
behavior of these indicators is helpful for evaluating the value of studies carried out in
isolated contexts, that is, with access to data on either, but not both, levels. The method is by
comparing data collected by Statistics Belgium on Flemish municipalities, to data collected
at citizen level by means of a face-to-face survey. The available evidence supplies at best a
meager basis for presupposing a shared component of the indicators under study.
Keywords Social capital   Consistency   Ecological inference problem
1 Introduction
The question of how the trend of decreasing trust in government of citizens in Western
democracies can be reversed, has been a research topic in social, political and public
management studies for already more than a decade (Nye et al. 1997). The solution to the
conﬁdence crisis, according to Robert Putnam (2000), lies in restoring and utilizing the
social capital of the populations concerned. The main hypothesis of Bowling Alone has been
summarized as ‘‘measurable declines in group activities cause bad outcomes’’ (Sobel 2002).
The local level of government is receiving increasing esteem in contemplations on trust in
multileveldemocraticgovernmentsystems.Communitiescansolveproblemsthatotherwise
appear as classic market or state failures, because their members have crucial information
about other members’ behaviors, capacities, and needs (Bowles and Gintis 2002: 422).
Social capital serves as the adhesive which links members within a group and as a bridge
which links several groups with each other (Lang and Hornburg 1998). Governments play a
vital role in determining the degree of inﬂuence that organized interests, and individual
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631). Local governance affects the distribution of social capital, because the city’s ‘political
opportunity structure’ provides incentives, expectations and openings for people to under-
take collective action within the political system (Kearns 2004: 11).
However, social capital is surrounded with much controversy. The list of discords is
almost endless. Social capital is supposed to have both positive (constructive) and negative
(destructive) impact (Portes 1998). It is considered at the level of individuals as a condition
for institutional trust, where at the same time public institutions are supposed to make the
citizensmoretrusting(seeFoleyandEdwards1999,forastudyontheuseofsocialcapitalas
dependent or independent variable in scientiﬁc literature). Social capital is supposed to have
beneﬁcial impact both within the American capitalist and within the European social dem-
ocratic state models (Navarro 2002). It may serve as the means to have power concerning
ones own destiny, and to exercise power over others (see Smith and Kulynych 2002: 158).
For some, social capital can only play a role in the distribution of existing prosperity (zero
sum game), whereas others consider social capital vital for the creation of new prosperity
(Woolcock1998).Socialcapitalproducespositiveoutcomes,suchaseconomicdevelopment
andlesscrime,andatthesametimepresenceofsocialcapitalisinferredfromtheseoutcomes
(Portes 1998: 19). The eminent circularity in the reasoning, that social capital is both cause
and effect of good governance, produces tautologies. Durlauf (2002: 474) argues that
The empirical social capital literature is plagued by vague deﬁnitions of concepts,
poorly measured data, absence of exchangeability conditions, and lack of informa-
tion necessary to make identiﬁcation claims in conﬁrmatory statistical analysis
plausible.
Another important problem, and the focus of this article, concerns the incompatibility of
conclusions reached at aggregate (e.g., municipalities, regions, states) and micro level
(e.g., citizens). Regardless of the tautologies in Putnam’s reasoning, his conclusions on the
effects of social capital at aggregate level (the southern and northern regions of Italy) are
not replicated in studies at micro level (e.g., Pennants 2005 study on diversity, trust and
community participation in England) or international level (e.g., Knack and Keefer’s 1997
study on memberships in formal groups and economic performance; Bjornskov’s 2006
cross-national comparison of social capital indicators). This problem, also known within
the context of the ‘‘ecological inference problem’’ (e.g., King 1997), places doubts on the
cross level consistency of measures of social capital.
In this paper, we try to shed some light on the issue of operationalization of fuzzy
concepts by comparing individual, citizen or survey based indicators, with municipal or
aggregate level based indicators of social capital and local government performance. With
knowledge about the behavior of indicators of social capital and local government per-
formance at micro and aggregate level, we are better equipped to judge the value of studies
carried out in isolated contexts, that is, with access to data on either, but not both, levels.
The generic conclusions on cross level consistency of the indicators of the study below are
probably generalizable to situations where e.g., the aggregate level corresponds to nation
states and the micro level to regions or municipalities. Of course, additional research is
necessary in order to establish (lack of) cross level consistency of the indicators at these
levels. The source of the data and the method of analysis are discussed in the next section.
We than elaborate on the speciﬁc measures that are to be compared for consistency, were
we recognize two distinct groups of variables: indicators of social capital, and indicators of
local government performance. Cross level consistency of the analyzed indicators is pre-
sented thereafter, followed by a discussion of the results in the ﬁnal section.
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1232 Data and Method
2.1 Sources for Micro Level and Aggregate Level Data
Both the micro level and the aggregate level data deal exclusively with the Flemish
communities, that is, those within the Dutch speaking region of Belgium. As for the
aggregate level data, we rely on a dataset collected by Coffe ´ and Geys (2005), who used a
dataset with indicators of social capital, neighborhood quality and local government per-
formance at local level. The major source of this data is Statistics Belgium, one of the many
organizations in Belgium responsible for the nation’s ofﬁcial statistics. A second source of
aggregate data are the local electoral results at municipal level. Local elections have been
held in Belgium in 2000 and 2006.
The municipalities are coded by a ﬁve digit coding system, the so-called NIS-code; e.g.,
Antwerp (that is, downtown Antwerp) is coded 11001. This variable is used to connect the
aggregate level data to the micro level (survey) data. The latter consist of a survey of 1,250
randomly selected Flemish citizens (with age between 18 and 80 years) nested within a
random sample of 80 Flemish municipalities. The survey data was collected in 2002 in
survey research issued by the Catholic University of Leuven commissioned by the ministry
of the Flemish Community (see e.g., Kampen 2007). The study was called WADO, which
stands for ‘‘Werken aan de Overheid’’, in English ‘‘Working on the Government’’. The
questionnaire aimed to investigate the relationship of public service quality and trust in
government. Thus, the survey provides a variety of items dealing with social capital and
local government performance, and that can be used to test the consistency with the
indicators measured at aggregate level. To this end, the datasets are merged using the NIS-
code as keyed variable. Statistics Belgium also applies a two digit code that classiﬁes
municipalities according to population density and cultivation. This variable clusters the
municipalities into nine classes ranging from urban to rural taking intermediate values in
between. We use this variable in order to explain differences between municipalities.
2.2 Indicators of Social Capital
The respondents were all asked with whom they discussed their personal problems during
the past 6 months. They were presented a list of possible persons and were required to
answer with a simple ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘not applicable’. Of course, the data have to be
interpreted while accounting for the fact not all people have e.g., a partner, or colleges,
etc.; thus, we consider with each statistic, the parameter f denoting the sample fraction
where a response was applicable. On the top of the list, probably not surprisingly, one ﬁnds
the partner or spouse (93.3% responded ‘yes’, f = 77.6), followed by children (73.7%,
f = 67.9), friends (69.7%, f = 97.8) and parents (69.4%, f = 65.3). Brothers and sisters
(55.1%, f = 86.0) and colleges (49.4%, f = 73.5) take a middle position, whereas the
wider family (24.1%, f = 94.2) and neighbors (18.2, f = 96.6) only play modest roles. The
total number of contacts people dispose over to discuss their personal problems may be
denoted
Fi ¼
X P
p¼1
fip;
where fip e {0, 1} denotes for respondent i, the feasibility to talk to the pth item in the list
of P possible persons. The scope of an individual’s network will be deﬁned
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Fi
P
;
which is the fraction of potential channels that a respondent has at his disposal. If we
accept that the number of channels people in effect use to discuss their personal problems
serves as an indicator of the degree of social isolation, than we may construct the index
Ti ¼
PP
p¼1 Xipfip
Fi
;
with Xip e {0, 1} denoting the value for the pth item in the list of P possible persons to talk
to
1: ‘no’ = 0 and ‘yes’ = 1. We refer to Ti as the interaction index: the higher the index,
the more a respondent takes advantage of the available channels to break through his or her
potential isolation.
Respondents were also given a list of associations and clubs, and were asked whether at
present or in the past, they were a member of the given group. In addition, if at present they
were a member, they could report whether they were passive or active members, and if
active, whether they were committee member or not. This differentiation is relevant in the
context of social capital studies (e.g., Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005: 311–318), but due
to data sparseness, we shall look only into the categories of ‘present members’, ‘former
members’, and ‘never members’. Accordingly, for all individuals, two membership indices
are constructed. The ﬁrst simply counts the number of associations that an individual is at
present a member of, divided by the number of possible associations (membership index).
The second divides the number of associations that an individual is or has been a member
by the number of possible associations (historic membership index). At present, the
greatest number of people is member of a sports club or a labor union (26%). The third
place is taken by socio-cultural associations (22%), followed by cultural associations
(15%) such as reading clubs, charity (10%), associations to improve the environment (7%)
such as Greenpeace, and political associations (6%). Less popular memberships include
youth organizations (5%), religious associations (5%), neighborhood organizations (4%),
and last but not least, advisory boards (4%). Historic membership is highest for sports clubs
(49% of all respondents at one point in their lives had been a member), followed by youth
organizations (46%), and labor unions in the third place (34%).
A visualization of these memberships in terms of a circle diagram (see Scott 2007: 147)
is displayed in Fig. 1. Lines in the circle diagram are drawn if at least 5% of the total
sample at one point in their lives had been a member of the pair of associations, with bolder
lines corresponding to higher joint historic memberships, bearing to a maximum of 26.8%
who in their lives have been a member of a sports club and (simultaneously or not) of a
youth organization. The most likely social network appears to be located within the
pentagon of the sports club, youth association, labor union, socio-cultural, and cultural
organizations.
Coffe ´ and Geys (2005) chose the municipal crime level, electoral turn-out and the
number of associations per capita as indicators of social capital at aggregate level.
Associational life was operationalized as the number of organizations per capita in a
municipality, where the organizations mainly included sports clubs and socio-cultural
organizations, such as associations of retired people, women’s associations, associations of
parents, and the like. Electoral turn-out was computed as the number of valid plus invalid
votes casted at the 2000 local elections, divided by the number of registered voters. The
1 In the event that Fi = 0, in other words, when a person reports to have no-one to talk to, we deﬁne Ti = 0.
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123crime level, which served as a measure of generalized trust, was deﬁned as the number of
crimes per capita as reported by the local police. However, although the choice to oper-
ationalize crime level in terms of number of crimes per capita appeals to academia’s norms
of objective quantiﬁcation, local newspapers in general do not take into account that larger
communities produce more crime in absolute ﬁgures. That is to say, the space in news-
papers (and other media) assigned to crimes does not correspond to the percentage of
people exposed to criminal facts. As pointed out by Glassner (1999), who found that fear of
homicide increased in the USA in the nineties, not because homicide ﬁgures were rising (in
fact, they dropped) but because media coverage increased (by several hundreds of per-
cents), it is not fact but perception that governs the responses of the general public.
Therefore, the raw number of crimes in a municipality must also be considered to be a
potentially valid indicator of (lack of) social capital and interpersonal trust.
2.3 Indicators of Local Government Performance
The WADO survey includes three items measured at ﬁve point ordinal scales that deal with
opinions on the performance of local government. They consist of two questions about the
local administration, and one about the Mayor:
(1) To what extent are you satisﬁed with the performance of the local administration?
(very little–very much)
(2) To what extent do you trust the local administration? (very little–very much)
(3) How do you evaluate the image of the Mayor? (very negative–very positive)
The ordinal scale of measurement complicates the making of cross level comparisons
with the other indicators, because the computing of means at municipal level yields ill-
deﬁned indicator variables (see e.g., Kampen and Swyngedouw 2000). This problem is
Fig. 1 Joint historical memberships in Flanders (2002)
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the other three. Such a dichotomous variable has a ratio scale, and its mean at the level of a
municipality simply represents the proportion of respondents within the municipality that
are satisﬁed, trusting and have a positive image, respectively.
Aggregate government performance was deﬁned by Coffe ´ and Geys (2005) by com-
puting the relative budget deﬁcit as the difference of total local government revenues plus
total expenditures (including investments) divided by the total revenues. As in the case
of crime level, news reporters may not be sensitive to nuances about the relative level of
deﬁcit, and therefore, the absolute budget deﬁcit must also be considered as an indicator of
local government approval. Performance operationalized in these ﬁnancial terms is inﬂu-
enced by the ideological orientation of the parties in the local coalitions, because leftist
governments are often thought to be supporters of big governments and therefore, of larger
government spending and possibly, larger deﬁcits. Coffe ´ and Geys (2005), following
Volkerink and De Haan (2001), operationalized ideological fragmentation as the standard
deviation of the ideological position of the coalition partners. A socio-economic variable at
aggregate level called cost efﬁciency, ﬁnally, was operationalized by Coffe ´ and Geys as a
scale composed from the total of students in primary schools, the total surface of recre-
ational facilities (e.g., parks), the population size, and the fraction of elderly people. The
idea is that cost efﬁcient municipalities are able to do more with their revenues, which in
turn serves as an indicator of local government performance.
The 2000 and 2006 electoral results are used to construct a variable called coalition
support. Belgium’s fragmented political landscape usually leads to the building of coali-
tions at the local level consisting of three or more different parties. Coalition support is a
dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the 2000 coalition was re-installed after the
2006 local elections, and coalition support equals zero otherwise. Coalition support will
serve as a proxy for the level of trust in government at aggregate level.
2.4 Statistical Methodology
Generally, in the case of two measures of the same phenomenon, we would expect these
measures to show correlation when they are measured at metric scale, stochastic depen-
dence in the case of a categorical measurement scale, and between-variance if one measure
is metric and the other categorical. However, interpreting even a well-know statistic as the
correlation of an indicator at micro and aggregate level is not as straightforward as it may
seem at ﬁrst glance. Cross-level analysis is deceptively difﬁcult (Achen and Shively 1995:1 ) .
At individual level, some indicator A for individual i nested within municipality j can be
decomposed as
VA
ij ¼ lA þ d
A
j þ eA
ij;
with VA
ij the observed value of the indicator, lA the overall mean, d
A
j the deviation of the
overall mean within municipality j, and eA
ij the deviation of the mean in the jth municipality
for individual j, usually called error term. Consider the aggregate level indicator A0
VA0
ij ¼ lA þ d
A
j ;
which in this example is equivalent to the micro level indicator VA
ij minus the micro level
deviation term eA
ij; in other words, for each individual the indicator A0 simply equals the
mean of the indicator A within his/her municipality. Upon abbreviating var d
A
j
  
¼ x2
A and
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ij
  
¼ r2
A; it is easy to see that the correlation of the micro en aggregate level
indicator,
rAA0
¼
cov VA
ij;VA0
ij
  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
var VA
ij
  
var VA0
ij
   r ¼
x2
A ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2
A þ r2
A
  
x2
A
q ;
satisﬁes r
AA0
= 1 if and only if the micro level variance r2
A = 0 (which corresponds to the
situation that all individual deviations eA
ij equal zero). In other occasions, the individual
variance component r2
A has a diminishing effect on the correlation, so that r
AA0
\1. Thus,
the seemingly identical indicators A and A0 will not show perfect correlations in empirical
settings, even though these indicators would satisfy straightforward requirements of cross
level indicator consistency. Moreover, a lack of signiﬁcance cannot be taken as evidence
that the indicators are not associated, because the signiﬁcance is inversely related to the
variance of the micro level error term.
The obvious remedy to this problem is to look only into the behavior of the indicators at
aggregate level, but this leads to a major complication regarding the interpretation of the
resulting measures of association. For instance, suppose that at aggregate level, higher
numbers of associations per capita correlate to higher budget surpluses in municipalities
(a ﬁnding reported by Coffe ´ and Geys 2005: 495). We may then ask, to what extent are the
individual members of associations ‘‘responsible’’ for the higher surpluses? This is an
instance of the ecological inference problem, and the aggregate level association is referred
to as an ecological correlation (Freedman 1999), as opposed to the ‘‘real’’ correlation
which would be measured at micro level.
The only way to obtain certainty about the relationship membership-number of asso-
ciations-budget surplus, requires access to data at both the individual and the aggregate
level. Separate association measures for the two levels can then be computed by applying
random effects models (e.g., Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Snijders and Bosker 1999;
Berkhof and Kampen 2004). These models are a generalization of the well known linear
regression model. Consider a micro level indicator B,
VB
ij ¼ lB þ d
B
j þ eB
ij:
Denote the variance-covariance terms of the indicators by var d
B
j
  
¼ x2
B; var eB
ij
  
¼
r2
B; cov d
A
j ;d
B
j
  
¼ xAB and cov eA
ij;eB
ij
  
¼ rAB: The correlation coefﬁcient of indicators A
and B is given by the ratio of their covariance and the square root of the product of their
respective variances,
rAB ¼
cov VA
ij;VB
ij
  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ ﬃ
var VA
ij
  
var VB
ij
   r ¼
xAB þ rAB ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2
A þ r2
A
  
x2
B þ r2
B ðÞ
q :
Upon estimation of each of the variance components, we are able to give an expression
of the between municipality correlation and the within municipality correlation coefﬁcients
rAB
b ¼
xAB ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
x2
Ax2
B
p ; rAB
w ¼
rAB ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
r2
Ar2
B
p :
The between municipality correlation coefﬁcient rAB
b is the estimated correlation of
indicators A and B that we would obtain if we had measures at aggregate level only. In
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w is the
correlation coefﬁcient that we would obtain on average if we had measures at micro level
and within a single randomly selected municipality only. Note that if at least one of the two
involved indicators is measured at aggregate level, then all terms including individual level
variance-covariance terms vanish from the equations and rAB
w ¼ 0. In the case that we
substitute A0 for B, it is easy to see that rAA0
b ¼ 1; and thus, the between correlation
coefﬁcient satisﬁes our requirement that it should show consistency.
Suppose that two indicators A and B are some micro level measure of ‘‘social capital’’.
In that case, if rAB
b ¼ 0, than the two measures of social capital are independent at the
municipal level and therefore, inconsistent at aggregate level. If the within coefﬁcient
rAB
w ¼ 0, than the measure is inconsistent at micro level. Of course, consistency across
measures increases with increasing correlations. In isolated studies, depending on analysis
exclusively at micro or aggregate level, the inconsistent indicators will be deemed insig-
niﬁcant and produce a publication bias.
3 The Cross Level Consistency of the Indicators
3.1 A Short Note on the External Validity of the Indicators of Social Capital
Not all of the micro level indicators of social capital discussed in Sect. 2.2 have been used
in this precise form in previous empirical sociological research. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to assess the external validity of these indicators. The micro level indicators of social
capital conﬁrm certain stereotypes related to gender. The t-test for equality of means
detects signiﬁcant differences between males and females for both the interaction index (T)
and the historic membership index. Males have on average, more often been a member of
some association (p = .001), whereas females tend to have a higher score on the inter-
action index (p = .003). The scope of possible persons to talk to (S), and the membership
index do not differ between the sexes.
A series of Pearson chi-square independence statistics (not printed) render the precise
differences between the sexes as follows. Reﬂecting traditional family organization pat-
terns, males have on average more often colleges than females (p = .003), but they are
equally (un)likely to discuss personal problems with their colleges (p = .500). On the other
hand, men are slightly more likely than women to discuss their personal problems with
their children (p = .003). Men are on average more often member of a sports club
(p\.001) and a labor union (p\.001) whereas women are more often member of socio-
cultural association (p\.001), most likely associations speciﬁcally organized for women.
These differences balance in the (present) membership index. Historically, however, and in
addition to the differences in present membership, men have more often than women been
a member of a political association (p\.001) or an advisory board (p = .005).
The interaction index and the membership index were constructed independently, yet
display a correlation of r = .17 (p\.001), indicating that people are more likely to
discuss their personal problems with other people when they engage in a group. When we
look into the indicator variables that were used to construct the membership index, we ﬁnd
that the indicators ‘cultural association’, ‘socio-cultural association’, ‘advisory board’,
‘charity’, and ‘other’ correlate weakly, but signiﬁcantly, with the interaction index.
Interestingly, the indicator ‘sports club’ correlates signiﬁcantly with the scope of contacts,
but not with the interaction index, suggesting that sporting is a way to meet people but not
to interact with them on a more personal level. This, together with the earlier ﬁnding that
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by Seippel (2008), who found that sports organizations are inﬂuential due to size, but
relatively weakly embedded and positioned in civil society. In sum, the selection of social
capital indicators shows external validity with well-known sociological facts.
3.2 The Consistency of Indicators of Social Capital
In Table 1, within, between and overall correlations of the indicators of social capital at
micro level are displayed. In all, the micro level indicators of social capital can be divided
into a group of variables that display predictable, and a set that displays less predictable,
behavior. Among the predictable relationships are the positive association of historic
membership and (present) membership, the impact of (historic) membership on the number
and scope of contacts, and the impact of the number of contacts and the interaction index.
Less appealing at ﬁrst sight, is the negative association between the scope of contacts and
the interaction index; however, if we bear in mind that the interaction index is concerned
with personal problems, it is evident that one cannot discuss such problems with anybody.
Thus, the micro level indicators of social capital appear to be consistent.
At aggregate level, see Table 2, counter intuitive correlations appear amongst the
number of associations in a municipality on the one hand, and the crime level indicators
(per capita and absolute) on the other hand. Whereas the correlation between absolute
numbers display nothing but a spurious correlation (third variable problem caused by the
size of the municipality), the fact that the absolute number of associations also increases
with the crime level per capita can only be explained from the apparent fact that bigger
cities have more crime. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed when we inspect partial correlations
of the involved indicators, controlled for the level of urbanization (see Sect. 2.1). The
correlation (not printed) between absolute and relative crime levels vanishes when con-
trolled for this confounding variable. Similar reasoning holds for the correlation of crime
per capita and number of associations. The other aggregate level indicators display con-
sistent behavior.
Cross level correlations of the social capital indicators are weak if signiﬁcant at all
(nominal a = .01); see Table 3. At the individual level, all correlations are insigniﬁcant,
thus illustrating the diminishing effect of the micro level variance explained in Sect. 2.3.
But even at aggregate level, indicators of social capital show inconsistent behavior. Par-
ticularly the absence of a signiﬁcant correlation between membership and the number of
associations (absolute or relative i.e., per capita) places doubts on the usefulness of these
indicators for operationalizing social capital. The weak relationships between indicators
become evident when we look at the explained variance or multiple R
2 values that are
obtained by predicting each of the indicators separately from the other level’s indicators by
multiple regression analysis. These values range from 1 (crime level per capita explained
by scope, contacts, interaction index, and the membership indices) to 10% (turn-out at the
2000 local elections explain by the same set of indicators). The shared component of these
indicators, which we assumed to be social capital, can hardly be distinguished from
ordinary noise. Even when we take into account that measurement error of micro level
indicators transformed into aggregate level indicators (the means within municipalities) is
higher than measurement error of variables measured at municipal level, the available
evidence supplies at best a meager basis for presupposing a shared component, let alone
that that component can be interpreted as social capital.
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1233.3 The Consistency of Indicators of Local Government Performance
The correlations of indicators of local government performance measured at micro level
are displayed in Table 4. The correlations of these subjective indicators are not over-
whelmingly high (in the order of .40 or 16% mutually explained variance), but they show a
consistent pattern of positive association. At aggregate level (Table 5), consistency is less
evident. Intuitively appealing is that higher relative budget deﬁcit corresponds to higher
budget deﬁcit and lower efﬁciency. Ideologically fragmentized councils are on the one
hand, more efﬁcient, but on the other hand, they have less relative budget deﬁcit and less
absolute budget deﬁcit, implying that these local governments are more inclined to play a
zero sum game in local spending.
Table 3 Cross level correlations of social capital indicators
Scope Contacts Interaction index Membership Hist. membership R
2
Crime level per capita -.09 NS NS NS NS .01
Crime level NS .11 .12 -.08 -.12 .07
Turn out .17 NS -.11 NS NS .10
Associations per capita .15 .08 -.18 NS .08 .04
Associations -.10 -.10 .12 NS -.10 .02
R
2 .05 .03 .03 .04 .08
Table 4 Within, between and overall correlations of micro level performance indicators
Satisfaction Trust
Within Between Overall Within Between Overall
Trust .43 .45 .43 1 1 1
Mayor image .32 .41 .32 .22 .42 .24
Table 5 Between correlations of aggregate level performance indicators
Relative
budget deﬁcit
Absolute
budget deﬁcit
Ideological
fragmentation
Cost
efﬁciency
Absolut budget def. .33 1
Ideol. fragmentation -.10 .44 1
Cost efﬁciency -.16 .08 .14 1
Coalition support -.07 -.12 .12 NS
Table 2 Between correlations of aggregate level social capital indicators
Cr. per cap. Crime Turn out As. per cap. As.
Crime level .72 1
Turn out -.74 -.74 1
Associations per capita -.43 -.46 .70 1
Associations .76 .98 -.74 -.41 1
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increases with increasing ideological fragmentation and there is no relationship with cost
efﬁciency. Taking cross level correlations into account (Table 6), the keeping of a ﬁnancial
balance is not rewarded in terms of satisfaction, trust, and image, where cross level
correlations are not signiﬁcant. Financial output measures are more important indicators of
satisfaction, trust and image than ideological fragmentation and efﬁciency.
When assessing the cross level correlations between the indicators on micro and
aggregated level, we are surprised by the negative association between coalition support on
the one hand and the trust of the local administration and the image of the Mayor on the
other side. It concerns an ecological correlation, and from the fact that the total correlation
is not signiﬁcant we can infer that we cannot generalize the association to the level of the
citizens. From further analysis it became clear that the link does not disappear when we
correct for the size and population density in the municipality, or for the ideological
fragmentation of the coalition. Even if we take into account the fact that the link is weak
(the explained variance of coalition support as predicted from the conﬁdence in the local
government and the image of the Mayor is 3%), the association is counter-intuitive and
cannot be explained by the existing literature on good governance.
On the whole, cross level consistency of indicators of local government performance are
somewhat higher than in the case of social capital, still reaching only moderate levels, 16%
being the maximum amount of variance that one set of indicators can explain of another
indicator in multivariate regression analyses.
3.4 Cross Level Cross Dimension Consistency of the Indicators of Social Capital
Because their causal link has been suggested in the literature (see Sect. 1), a short account
of the empirical ﬁndings on associations of governance and social capital indicators is in
order, even when we are unable to elaborate on the theoretical implications of the ﬁndings.
The causal relationship between social capital and local government performance
(regardless of direction), could reveal itself as signiﬁcant correlations of their respective
indicators. Of course, a signiﬁcant correlation is not a sufﬁcient condition to imply cau-
sality, but it would provide a ﬁrst line of evidence that a causal relationship exists. Table 7
displays the correlations across dimensions for the indicators at micro level. The results are
disappointing. Within and overall correlations are without exception insigniﬁcant, meaning
Table 6 Cross level correlations of government performance indicators
Satisfaction Trust Mayor image R
2
Between Overall Between Overall Between Overall
Relative budget deﬁcit -.23 NS NS NS -.12 NS .16
Absolute budget deﬁcit -.37 -.10 -.26 NS -.26 NS .16
Ideol. fragmentation -.18 NS -.24 NS -.18 NS .06
Cost efﬁciency NS NS .10 NS .16 NS .05
Coalition support NS NS -.13 NS -.16 NS .03
R
2 .15 NS .10 NS .11 NS
Reported R
2 is the adjusted multiple R
2 in stepwise analysis including the micro level indicators as pre-
dictors of the aggregate level indicators, and vice versa
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123that at the most detailed level a causal chain cannot be inferred. At the aggregate level, the
image of the Mayor increases signiﬁcantly, but hardly relevantly, with increasing levels of
social capital indicators. Multivariate and at aggregate level, the four indicators jointly
explain 2% of the total variance of the image of the Mayor. The impact of micro level
social capital indicators on micro level local government performance indicators also
approaches zero.
Finally, when we look at all indicators of social capital taken together as predictors of
subjective indicators of local government performance, it is only satisfaction with local
administration which is worthwhile to discuss, with 20% of its variance at aggregate level
explained. The social capital indicators measured at municipal level account for the larger
part of its explained variance. Interestingly, absolute numbers of crime and associations are
better predictors than their relative (per capita) counterparts. More crime means less sat-
isfaction with the local administration. The negative correlation of the absolute number of
associations in a municipality and satisfaction is counter intuitive, but has the usual
explanation in terms of the third variable problem that we encountered earlier (Sect. 3.2):
the partial correlation of the absolute number of associations and satisfaction equals zero
when controlled for urbanisation. In other words, evidence in this data of a causal rela-
tionship between social capital and local government performance is weak, and in many
instances, cannot be separated from the effect of demographic characteristics of the
involved municipalities.
Table 7 Cross dimension cross level correlations of indicators
Satisfaction Trust Image
Within Between Overall Within Between Overall Within Between Overall
Micro level
Scope NS .18 NS NS NS NS NS NS NS
Contacts NS NS NS NS NS NS NS .13 NS
Interaction index NS -.14 NS NS NS NS NS .11 NS
Membership NS NS NS NS .14 NS NS .11 NS
Historic
membership
NS NS NS NS .17 NS NS .09 NS
Aggregate level
Crime level per
capita
-.18 -.09 -.13 NS -.11 NS
Crime level -.33 NS -.22 NS -.12 NS
Turn out .14 NS NS NS NS NS
Associations per
capita
NS NS NS NS NS NS
Associations -.34 -.09 NS NS NS NS
Micro level indicators
R
2
NS .04 NS NS .03 NS NS .02 NS
Aggr. level indicators
R
2
.14 NS .12 NS .04 NS
All indicators R
2 NS .20 NS NS .12 NS NS .06 NS
Reported R
2 is the adjusted multiple R
2 in stepwise analysis including, respectively the micro level,
aggregate level and all levels indicators in the row of the table as a predictor of the column indicator
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The consistency of the indicators cross levels of measurement as deﬁned by their mutual
correlations is low. The lack of correlation of membership in associations on the one hand,
and the number of associations (per capita) in a municipality on the other, defeats all
aspiration to operationalize social capital in a simple way. But also more advanced
approaches, where in Bjornskov’s (2006) words, ‘‘multiple facets of social capital’’ are
brought together into a single multivariate model, produces only poor ﬁt statistics in terms
of explained variance, taking values between 2 and 20%. The shared component of the
social capital indicators can hardly be distinguished from ordinary noise. It is perhaps
useful to remember at this point, that it is good scientiﬁc practice following William of
Ockham, not to multiply the number of truths unnecessarily. The economy principle means
that when we use membership of associations as an indicator of e.g., local government
performance, we must continue to speak of the (alleged) impact of membership and not of
social capital. This principle is concisely presented by Smith and Kulynych (2002):
What Putnam is really advocating is healthy people, economic prosperity, and
genuine democracy. But social capital, broadly deﬁned, only sometimes contributes
to these wider goods. So we are left wondering, why not simply advocate health,
wealth, and democracy rather than social capital?
For both policy makers and social scientists alike such tangible measures provide a
much more solid basis for theorizing than diffuse concepts such as social capital, which is
too coarse a notion to explain trends or even isolated events in real life. Beugelsdijk (2008)
argues that a distinction needs to be made between issues of measurement and issues of
theoretical relations, an argument which we can only fully support on the basis of the
present empirical assessment of consistency of measures of social capital.
Ofcourse,thewayinwhichconsistencywasdeﬁned(correlationsbetweenmeasures) has
its own limitations. The possibility that there is a causal link between two indicators cannot
be dismissed entirely when a zero correlation is observed, because there may be two causal
circuits at work. For instance, higher levels of social capital may have positive inﬂuence on
trust in local government, but social capital may simultaneously increase expectations,
leading to a negative impact on trust.The two effects taken together may lead to an observed
correlation equal to zero. Such complicated relationships cannot be addressed while taking
only simple correlations into account, and future research that accounts for expectations is
therefore necessary in order to satisfactorily answer questions on causality.
We shall elaborate on two other conclusions from our empirical research, because they
may serve as guidelines for future research on social capital and related issues. As we
already said (see Sect. 1), social capital links members within a group and links several
groups with each other. It deals in other words, with social networks, and the obvious
research methodology for conducting social scientiﬁc research on social capital would
appear to be social network analysis. In social network analysis (e.g., Scott 2007;
Carrington et al. 2005), groups are identiﬁed as cliques, social circles and structurally
cohesive blocks. The data show evidence that the municipal level appears to be a good unit
of analysis of issues regarding social capital (and related concepts). A municipality acts
like a self-contained universe with subjects that display, to a certain degree, predictable
behavior, as shown by the signiﬁcant values of the between correlations. The universe is
self-contained, because there is evidence that citizens do not look over the ‘‘borders’’ of
their own municipality: absolute ﬁgures (crime, spending deﬁcit) have greater impact on
subjective government performance indicators than relative numbers. The behavior is
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123predictable, because the signs of the correlations have theoretically justiﬁable directions. A
problem that we encountered sometimes is that apparent (causal) relationships are the
effect of a confounding variable such as the level of urbanization, but that only means that
comparable to micro level analyses, correlation research at the aggregate level must take
such demographic variables into account in order to avoid spurious correlations. The
theory on social network analysis can be applied with municipalities (or regions, or
countries) as the basic unit of analysis, where distances between municipalities can be
expressed in terms of the number of exchanged commuters, length of mutual borders,
mutual engagement in public–private partnerships, etc. Such analyses on social capital
issues would also provide information on the question whether regions (as used in the
original Putman contribution, and by e.g., Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005), municipal-
ities, or neighborhoods are the appropriate aggregate level of analysis. At the level of
citizens, promising work in the area of social network analysis has been carried out by e.g.,
Van der Gaag and Snijders (2003, 2005).
Anotherlineofresearch,however,extendstothemicrolevelofanalysisandfocusesmore
deeply on the ecological inference problem. Although generally in our empirical study of
socialcapitalandgovernanceindicators,thewithincorrelationsareofthesamemagnitudeas
the corresponding between correlations, there are instances when differences between these
association measures are quite large and require further investigation. For instance, the
between correlation of the interaction index and the scope of contacts (rb =- .50; see
Table 1) is more than double the size of the within correlation (rw =- .20), and the same
holds for the items concerning the Mayor’s image and trust in local government (rb = .42,
rw = .22; see Table 4). In other words, the ecological correlation in these cases is consid-
erably higher than the real correlation (see Sect. 2.4; note that empirical within and overall
correlations are always of similar magnitude, justifying the use of the word ‘‘real’’). There is
no obvious explanation of this result but it certainly merits the effort of future empirical
research. In fact, elaborating on the ecological inference problem may be the key to ﬁnd
explanations for the inconsistency of indicators for social capital, government performance,
andcomparablehybridconcepts,andtheincompatibilityofconclusionsreachedataggregate
and micro level. This is no simple task. The problems of confounding and aggregation bias,
says Freedman (1999), are unlikely to be resolved in the proximate future. It is however, a
challenge that must be met if the theory on social capital is to produce fruitful results.
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